Abstract. We study a model where two opposing provers debate over the membership status of a given string in a language, trying to convince a weak verifier whose coins are visible to all. We show that the incorporation of just two qubits to an otherwise classical constant-space verifier raises the class of debatable languages from at most NP to the collection of all Turing-decidable languages (recursive languages). When the verifier is further constrained to make the correct decision with probability 1, the corresponding class goes up from the regular languages up to at least E.
Introduction
It is well known that the model of alternating computation is equivalent to a setup where two opposing debaters try to convince a resource-bounded deterministic verifier about whether a given input string is in the language under consideration or not [CKS81] . Variants of this model where the verifier is probabilistic, and the communications between the debaters are restricted in several different ways, have been studied [CFLS93, FK97, DSY14] . Quantum refereed games, where the messages exchanged between the debaters are quantum states, were examined by Gutoski and Watrous [GW07] .
Most of the work cited above model the verifier as opaque, in the sense that the outcomes of its coin throws are not visible to the debaters, who have a correspondingly incomplete picture of its internal state during the debate. These models can therefore be classified as generalizations of private-coin interactive proof systems [GMR89] to the competing multiple provers case. In this paper, we focus on models where all of the verifier's coins, as well as all communications, are publicly visible to all parties, making them generalizations of Arthur-Merlin games [Bab85] . A recent result [Yak12] established that a very small quantum component is sufficient to expand the computational power of classical proof systems of this kind considerably, by studying a setup where an otherwise classical constant-space verifier is augmented by a quantum register of just two qubits. We modify that protocol to show that the addition of a two-qubit quantum register to the classical finite state verifier raises the class of debatable languages from at most NP to that of all Turing-decidable languages. We also study the case where the verifier is required to take the correct decision with probability 1. We show that small quantum verifiers outperform their classical counterparts in this respect as well, exhibiting an increase from the class of regular languages to at least E = DTIME(2 O(n) ).
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The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes our model and reviews previous work. Our result on the computational power of the model with a two-qubit constant-space verifier in the two-sided bounded error case is presented in Section 3. Section 4 contains an examination of the more restricted zero-error case. Section 5 concludes the paper with some remarks on the possible usage of multihead automata as verifiers.
Preliminaries
Consider an interactive system consisting of three actors: two debaters named Player 1 (P1) and Player 0 (P0), respectively, and a Verifier (V). All actors have access to a common input string w. P1 tries to convince V that w is a member of the language L under consideration, whereas P0 wants to make V reject w as a non-member. The debaters communicate with each other through a communication cell which is seen by every actor. Each debater writes a symbol in the communication cell when its turn comes, and V executes a further step of its computation, taking this communication and the outcomes of its coin into account. The debate continues in this way until the computation of V is terminated as it reaches a decision. We assume that both debaters see the coin outcomes of V as they occur, and thereby have complete information about the state of the verifier at any point.
In such a setup, we say that language L has a debate checkable by a machine V with error bound ǫ ∈ [0, 1 2 ) if -for each w ∈ L, P1 is able to make V accept w with probability at least 1 − ǫ, no matter what P0 says in return, -for each w / ∈ L, P0 is able to make V reject w with probability at least 1 − ǫ, no matter what P1 says in return.
A language is said to be debatable if it has a debate checkable by some verifier.
Note that the class of debatable languages is closed under complementation. We focus on verifiers which are only allowed to operate under constant space bounds. When V is set to be a deterministic two-way finite automaton, the system described above is equivalent to an alternating two-way finite automaton, and the class of debatable languages coincides with the regular languages [LLS78] . When one replaces V with a two-way probabilistic finite automaton, the class in question becomes one that should be denoted ∀BC-SPACE(1) in the terminology of [Con89] , and is known to contain some nonregular languages [DS92], and to be contained in NP. We will show that the addition of a small amount of quantum memory to the probabilistic model increases the power hugely, all the way to the class of decidable languages.
The public-coin quantum verifier model that we will use is the two-way finite automaton with quantum and classical states (2QCFA) [AW02] , in which the quantum and classical memories are nicely separated, allowing a precise quantification of the amount of "quantumness" required for our task. Such automata execute quantum and classical moves alternately at each step:
-First, a superoperator 6 (Figure 1) , determined by the current classical state and the symbols being scanned on the input tape and in the communication cell, is applied to the quantum register (the quantum memory of the machine), with the outcome of the operator being automatically sent to the debaters. All entries of quantum operators are rational numbers, meaning that the probabilities of the outcomes are always rational, 7 and the debaters can easily keep track of the superposition in the quantum register.
-Then, the next classical state and tape head movement is determined by the current classical state and the observed outcome.
Execution halts when an outcome associated with "acceptance" or "rejection" is observed.
One obtains the definition of the quantum Arthur-Merlin (qAM) systems of [Yak12] when one removes P0 from the picture described above. Our results on small quantum verifiers for debates are based on the following result:
Fact 1 For any error bound ǫ > 0, every Turing-recognizable language (recursively enumerable language) has an Arthur-Merlin system where the verifier uses just two quantum bits, (i.e. four quantum states,) members of the language are accepted with probability 1, nonmembers are accepted with a probability not greater than ǫ, and a dishonest P1 can cause the machine to run forever without reaching a decision.
Proof. We outline the basic idea, referring the reader to [Yak12] for a detailed exposition of this proof. Let T be the single-tape Turing machine recognizing the language L under consideration. For any input string w, P1 (the only debater in this restricted scenario) is supposed to send the computation history (i.e. the sequence of configurations) of T on input w to the verifier V. Some of the For a 2QCFA with j quantum states, each superoperator E is composed of a finite number of j × j matrices called operation elements,
where k ∈ Z + , and the indices are the measurement outcomes. When a superoperator E is applied to a quantum register in state |ψ , then we obtain the measurement outcome i with probability pi = ψi| ψi , where | ψi is calculated as | ψi = Ei|ψ , and 1 ≤ i ≤ k. If the outcome i is observed (pi > 0), the new state of the system is obtained by normalizing | ψi which is |ψi =
. Moreover, the quantum register can be set to a predefined quantum state by an initialize operator with a single outcome. possible outcomes of V's observations of its quantum register will be interpreted as "restart" commands to P1. At any point, V may interrupt P1 and ask it to restart sending the computation history from the beginning in this manner. (In fact, the verifier is highly likely to require a restart at each step.)
Whenever the verifier catches P1 lying (i.e. giving an incorrect configuration description), it rejects the input. If the verifier reads a computation history sent by P1 all the way to its completion by a halting configuration without detecting an incorrect configuration, it halts with a decision paralleling the one described in that history with a certain non-zero probability, and requests a restart with the remaining probability.
A classical public-coin finite automaton faced with this task would not be able to compare two consecutive configuration descriptions c i and c i+1 (which may be very long).
8 A 2QCFA verifier handles this problem by encoding the substrings in question into the amplitudes of its quantum states.
9 Let next(c) denote the description of the configuration that is the legitimate successor, according to the transition function of T , of configuration c, and let e(x) denote an integer that encodes string x according to a technique to be described later. After the description c i+1 has been read, the amplitudes of the quantum states of V form the vector α (1 e(next(c i )) e(c i+1 ) e(next(c i+1 )))
T , where α is a small rational number. (The amplitude of the first state is used as an auxiliary value during the encoding [Yak12] , as will also be seen in the next section.)
When P1 concludes the presentation of c i+1 , V executes a move that has the effect of subtracting αe(next(c i )) from αe(c i+1 ), rejecting with a probability equal to the square of the difference, continuing with some little probability after placing the encoding of next(c i+1 ) into the second state's amplitude and resetting the third and fourth amplitudes to zero for beginning the next encodecompare stage, and requesting a restart with the remaining probability. If c i+1 's description is indeed equal to the valid successor of c i , the subtraction mentioned above yields zero probability of rejection. Otherwise, the rejection probability arising from a transition error within a computation history is guaranteed to be a big multiple of the acceptance probability that may arise due to that spurious history ending with an accepting configuration.
If w ∈ L, P1 need only obey the protocol, sending the accepting computation history, restarting each time V tells it to do so. In each try, P1 has a small but nonzero probability of sending the full history without being interrupted, leading to a nonzero probability of halting with acceptance. Since V will detect no transition errors between configurations, the probability of rejection is zero.
If w / ∈ L, any attempt of P1 to trick V to accept w with high probability by sneaking a transition error to the history and ending it with an accepting configuration will be foiled, since the rejection probability associated with the defect in the history can be guaranteed to be as big a multiple of the final acceptance probability as one desires. There is, however, one annoyance that P1 can cause V in this case: If P1 sends an infinite-length "configuration description" at any point 10 during its presentation, V will never reach the point where it compares the two amplitudes it uses for encoding, and it will therefore fail to halt.
⊓ ⊔
Small transparent verifiers for all decidable languages
Our first result is a generalization of the proof of Fact 1 to the setup with two debaters described in the previous section.
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Theorem 1. For every error bound ǫ > 0, every Turing-decidable language has a debate checkable by a 2QCFA with four quantum states, and with error bounded by ǫ.
Proof. We modify the verifier V described in the proof of Fact 1 in Section 2 to obtain a new verifier V 1 as follows: V 1 listens to both P0 and P1 in parallel. In the protocol imposed by V 1 , both debaters are expected to behave exactly as P1 was supposed to behave in that earlier proof; transmitting the computation history of the single-tape Turing machine T for language L on input string w, interrupting and restarting transmissions whenever V 1 observes an outcome associated with the "restart" action in its quantum register.
The strategy of V 1 is based on the fact that the two debaters are bound to disagree at some point about the computation history of T on w. As long as the same description is coming in from both debaters, V 1 uses the same technique mentioned in the proof of Fact 1, to be described in more detail shortly, for encoding the successive configurations. At the first point within a history when a mismatch between the two debaters is detected, V 1 uses its register to flip a fair coin to choose to trace one or the other debater's transmission from that time. The chosen debater's description of what it purports to be the computation history is then checked exactly as in the earlier proof, and the other debater is ignored until a restart is issued by V 1 to both players during (or at the end of) that check. The truthful debater always obeys the protocol. In the case that the other debater's transmission is identical to that of the truthful one, V 1 parallels the decision of T depicted by both debaters.
If it sees the debater it is tracing violating the protocol, for instance, making a transition error, V 1 rules in favor of the other player. When it sees a debater announcing the end of a computation history, V 1 decides in that debater's favor with some probability, and demands a restart with the remaining probability. Like the program described in the proof of Fact 1, V 1 is constructed so that the probability of the decision caused by the detection of a transition error in a computation history is guaranteed to be much greater than the probability of the decision caused by mimicking the result described at the end of that history.
A full description of V 1 would involve the complete presentation of its classical transition function, as well as all the operation elements of every superoperator associated with every triple of state, input symbol, and debate symbol. We will give a higher-level description of the program and its execution at a level that will allow the interested reader to construct the full 2QCFA if she wishes to do so.
A segment of computation which begins with a (re)start, and ends with a halting or restarting configuration will be called a "round" [YS10] . In each such round, each debater is supposed to transmit a string of the form
where c 1 is the description of the start configuration of T on w, each c i+1 is the legal successor of the corresponding c i , and c h−1 is the last configuration in the computation history before the halting configuration. (V 1 will be able to understand whether the successor of c h−1 is an accepting or rejecting configuration by focusing on the symbols around the tape head in c h−1 .) We assume that each configuration description ends with the blank symbol #, and that the alphabet Γ used to write the configurations does not include the $ symbol. Fix an ordering of the symbols in Γ , and let e(σ) denote the position of any symbol σ ∈ Γ in this ordering. Let m be an integer greater than the cardinality of Γ , we will fix its value later.
The state of the quantum register is set to |ψ 1,0 = (1 0 0 0) T at the beginning of each round.
Let l i be the length of c 1 $$c 2 $$ · · · c i $$ (i > 0).
As it reads the string w 1 = c 1 $$ from the debaters, V 1 both compares it with the input to catch a debater that may lie at this point, and also applies a superoperator corresponding to each symbol of w 1 to the register in order to encode next(c 1 ) as a number in base m (times a factor that will be described later) into the amplitude of the second quantum state. One operation element of the superoperator E 1,j applied when reading the jth symbol, say, σ, of w 1 is
where d is an integer which has the properties to be described now.
12 Since E 1,j would not obey the wellformedness criterion (Equation 1 in Figure 1 ) if its only operation element were E 1,j,1 , we add as many 4 × 4 rational matrices as necessary as auxiliary operation elements of E 1,j to complement its single main operation element E 1,j,1 to ensure that Equation 1 is satisfied. Furthermore, we do this for all superoperators to be described in the rest of the program in such a way that each of their main operation elements can be written with the same factor 1 d in front, as we just did for E 1,j,1 . This is the property that d must satisfy, and such a d can be found easily [Yak12, YS11] .
The observation outcome associated with all auxiliary operation elements will be interpreted as a "restart" command to the debaters. Some operation elements to be described below are associated with halting (acceptance or rejection). The outcomes of all remaining operation elements, including the E 1,j,1 , are "continue" commands.
Depending on whether the length of T 's configuration description increases as a result of its first move or not, we have the following cases: 
Task (2) described above is to be realized by operator E i,|ci$$| , which has one main operation element, as described in Figure 2 .
After a disagreement between the debaters is noticed, the verifier picks a debater with probability The associated action of this operation element is to reject the claim of this debater. Therefore, when talking to P0 (resp., P1), the input is accepted (resp., rejected) with probability The second main operation element is the one already described in Figure  2 , which either halts and decides, or readies the state vector for scanning the next configuration (with small probability) depending on whether that next configuration is a halting one or not.
Note that if the chosen debater is cheating and never sends any $'s, then the communication with it terminates with probability 1 without any decision.
The overall acceptance probability of such a "program with restart" equals the ratio of the acceptance probability to the halting probability in a single round [YS10] . The probability that the truthful debater will be selected after the disagreement is 1 2 . If this happens, V 1 will reach a halting state with the correct decision with some small probability, and restart with the remaining probability. In case the other debater is selected, there are two different possibilities of deception. If that debater presents an infinite "configuration", V 1 will restart sooner or later. Otherwise, if a finite but spurious history with one or more incorrect transitions is presented, V 1 may make the wrong decision with some small probability p 1 , but this is more than compensated by the much greater probability p 2 of its making the correct decision earlier on, when the transition error(s) in this history were detected. Overall, the error rate of ǫ of V 1 is bounded by p1 p1+p2 = 1 m 2 +1 , and can be tuned down to any desired positive value by choosing m, the base of the encoding used, to be a sufficiently large integer.
Debates with zero error
In classical computation, the benefits of using random bits come at the cost of incurring some nonzero probability of error; and "zero-error" probabilistic finite automata can be shown trivially to be no more powerful than their deterministic counterparts. We will now show that randomness without some tolerance of error is not useful for classical finite-state verifiers of debates, and then prove that things change in the quantum case.
Theorem 2. The computational power of a public-coin probabilistic debate checking system is reduced to the level of its deterministic counterpart when the verifier is not allowed to make any error in its final decision.
Proof. Assume that a language L has a debate checkable by a probabilistic verifier V p with zero error. We construct a deterministic verifier V d with the same space and time bounds as V p . V d mimics V p , except that whenever it needs to simulate a coin throw of V p , it reads the corresponding bit from P0. If a string w ∈ L, then P1 is able to convince V p to accept w, no matter what P0, or the coins of V p , can "say." Note that in such a case, P1 will be able to convince V d to accept w, no matter what P0 can say. If w / ∈ L, then P0 is able to convince V p to reject w, no matter what P1, or the coins of V p , can say. In this case, P0 would of course be able to convince V d to reject w, regardless of what P1 might say.
As mentioned in Section 2, languages with debates checkable by deterministic finite state verifiers are regular, whereas probabilistic verifiers can handle some nonregular languages when some error is allowed. We will now see that our small quantum verifiers can do much more with zero error.
Theorem 3. Every language in the class E has a debate checkable by a 2QCFA with four quantum states, and with zero error.
Proof. Since E = ASPACE(n) (the class of languages recognized by alternating Turing machines (ATMs) using linear space) [CKS81] , it is sufficient to show how to trace the execution of a linear-space alternating Turing machine (ATM). Let A be an ATM that decides a language L, using at most kn tape squares for its computation on any string of length n, for a positive integer k. Assume, without loss of generality, that A alternates between existential and universal states at each step, and that the start state is an existential state.
We construct a 2QCFA V 0 that checks debates on membership in L. V 0 is a variant of the verifier V 1 described in the proof of Theorem 1. In this version, the debaters play a game to produce a computation history of A on the input w of length n. The protocol dictates that P1 starts by announcing the first existential choice to be made. Both debaters then transmit the start configuration of A on w parallelly. P0 then announces the first universal choice as a response to the first move of P1, followed by both debaters transmitting the configuration that A would reach by executing the choice announced by P1 in the beginning. In general, the choice that determines configuration c i+1 is announced by the corresponding debater before the transmission of configuration c i . As usual, the verifier may order the debaters to restart the whole thing at any step.
After using it to check that the first configuration description is accurate, V 0 starts moving its reading head on the input tape back and forth at the appropriate speed to make sure that neither debater sends a configuration description longer than nk symbols in the rest of the transmission, deciding against any debater seen to violate this rule. As described for the verifiers in our earlier proofs, V 0 scans the parallel transmissions, encoding the last configuration descriptions it has seen, as well as their legal successors according to the choices that have already been announced by the debaters. If the debaters send the same complete history, V 0 halts and announces the result in that history. If the debaters disagree, V 0 flips a coin and picks one debater's transmission to trace, just like V 1 . Unlike V 1 , however, V 0 does not trace this debater until it sends a halting configuration. Instead, V 0 just performs the transition check between the previously sent configuration and the presently sent one, 13 and then issues a restart command. V 0 does not imitate any decision of A that it may see in the transmission of the chosen debater; the only way that V 0 can halt without any restarts after choosing a debater is by detecting a transition error, and deciding in favor of the other debater.
If both debaters obey the protocol, then P1 will always be able to demonstrate an accepting computation history of A on w if w ∈ L, and P0 will always be able to demonstrate a rejecting computation history of A on w if w / ∈ L. So let us examine the case where one debater is lying.
If V 0 chooses the truthful debater to trace, it will detect no error, and so will restart with certainty. If it chooses the other debater, it will detect a transition error and announce the correct decision with some probability, and restart with the remaining probability. There is no possibility that V 0 can make an error. ⊓ ⊔
Concluding remarks
It is well known that finite automata with k classical input heads can use them as one can use logarithmic space; for instance, to count up to O(n k ). One can therefore extend the argument of Theorem 3 to APSPACE (the class of languages recognized by ATMs using polynomial space), which equals EXPTIME [CKS81] , concluding that every language in the class EXPTIME has a zero-error (publiccoin) debate checkable by a multiple-head 2QCFA with four quantum states Debate systems with deterministic logarithmic-space (or equivalently, multihead finite-state) verifiers which have the additional property that P0 can hide some of its messages to the verifier from P1 are known to correspond to the class EXPTIME. If one upgrades the verifier in this model to a probabilistic version, but demands that it should still make zero error, the computational power does not change, since zero-error probabilistic machines can be derandomized easily. We can therefore also state that every language in the class EXPTIME has such a "partial-information" debate checkable by a private-coin multiple-head two-way probabilistic finite automaton with zero error.
